RE-THINK THE MIDDLE EAST

by Michael Lame, posted on December 29, 2009

At the end of my last posting, I wrote that in Part 2 “ I’ll suggest a few, hopefully provocative, specific do’s and don’ts for the new year.”

Each and every one of the following suggestions has a downside to it. Each can be dismissed as “unrealistic” because one or another side currently finds it objectionable. That is also true of the most popular ideas now in circulation. A two-state solution, for example, has major downsides for both peoples.

So far, no proposal or process has succeeded in resolving Palestinian-Israeli conflict. Nothing has worked. That fact alone should give us pause, providing the basis for some humility and a wee bit of uncertainty about the likelihood that anyone knows the answer to the problem.

So let’s start the new year by examining, newly and freshly, different ways of viewing the conflict, different ways of addressing it, and different proposed solutions for it.

For what they are worth, here are my 2010 suggestions to President Obama, Secretary Clinton, and Special Envoy Mitchell for re-thinking and re-tooling America’s approach to this conflict. No attempt has been made to insure that this list is either comprehensive or balanced.

What Not to Do

Let’s start with what not to do, or rather, what not to say:

1) Stop talking about 242 and 338. They are out of date and out of juice.

2) Stop talking about the Road Map. It’s a map that neither side wanted and neither side has followed.

3)  Stop talking about land for peace. The Palestinians need more than land in order to build a state. The Israelis need more than a peace treaty in order to sleep soundly at night.

4)  Stop talking about a commitment to a Palestinian state, but don’t stop working towards it. It’s still unclear if that circle can be squared. To be so publicly committed to such an iffy proposition is not wise foreign policy. This is the United States. We don’t get points internationally for trying. We should commit ourselves to what we can deliver, and we cannot guarantee success in forcing two unwilling peoples to make peace.

5)  Stop talking about getting the parties back to the negotiating table as soon as possible. As we saw with the collapse of the Camp David II talks in 2000, talks that aren’t well prepared for and that don’t have a reasonable likelihood of success can lead not only to failure but also to the outbreak of deadly violence.

What productive actions could the U.S. take in 2010?

Refugees

An unconscionably large number of Palestinians have no citizenship or passports. The United States should explore constructive ways to address this problem without waiting for it to be dealt with in final status negotiations. After all, no one knows if or when such negotiations will take place or prove productive. The Palestinian refugees and their descendants should no longer be held hostage to the “peace process”.

The United States could create a taskforce – completely separate from the Mitchell team – to work towards ending that condition of statelessness. The idea here is to directly tackle perhaps the most tragic aspect of the conflict. In doing so, it must be made clear by the U.S. government that Palestinian acceptance of citizenship from any country in the world will not adversely affect the political or economic rights of Palestinians regarding their status as Palestinians or their original homes in Palestine.

The West Bank

The settlement freeze issue was so mucked up by the administration this year that it’s probably best not to make it a focal point of its efforts in 2010.

Instead, insist (and verify) that the Israelis significantly accelerate the pace of reducing the number of roadblocks and checkpoints and take other measurable, substantive actions to ease personal travel and commercial transportation in the West Bank. These are some of many steps needed to promote economic development and personal freedom for the Palestinian community in the West Bank.

Gaza

The Gazan population is largely cut off from the rest of the world. Travel is severely restricted. A very limited list of foodstuffs and other products is allowed in by the Israelis. Under these conditions, reconstruction is impossible. Hamas and Israel have been stalemated since January. The people of Gaza are the losers. The winners are the Israeli residents of Sderot and other nearby communities that are no longer shelled from Gaza.

Once the prisoner exchange is completed, the US should insist that Israel significantly relax the siege of Gaza, provided that the shelling of Israel does not begin again.

Re-Assess the Likelihood of a Negotiated Settlement

Through discussions with the Palestinian Authority, the Israeli government, and other Palestinian and Israeli players, U.S. officials should delineate as precisely as possible the remaining gaps between Palestinian and Israeli positions on all issues (not just the “big four” of security, borders, refugees, and Jerusalem). These sticky issues include, among others: the disposition of West Bank settlements and settlers outside the areas which will likely be retained by Israel; economic relations between Israel and Palestine; water management; Gaza-West Bank links; and ending incitement.

Act on the Assessment

Based on the current gaps between the parties and the history of those gaps, assess whether any meeting of the minds between Israelis and Palestinians is a real likelihood by 2012 or by 2016. If not, switch gears from conflict resolution mode to conflict management mode.

If the assessment results in the conclusion that a deal is a real likelihood in the next few years, then formulate a set of questions for each side regarding a range of compromise options most likely to bring about a resolution of the conflict. (This is distinctly different from the US preparing a set of bridging proposals of its own on how to end the conflict.)

Formally and publicly ask these questions of both sides.

Encourage the Israelis to open up more public debate in Israel regarding these questions and regarding the specific likely sacrifices that will be necessary to reach a deal with the Palestinians.

Encourage the Palestinians to open up more public debate within Palestinian communities across the Middle East regarding these questions and regarding the likely sacrifices that will be necessary for reaching a deal with the Israelis.

Israelis and Palestinians live in highly politicized communities. If their leaders are to make painful concessions for peace, the groundwork must be laid with the populace. For the US to make an appeal to the people on both sides to grapple with the most difficult issues is an attempt to engage the two nations in moving towards a mutually beneficial arrangement – at least a modus vivendi, if not a peace treaty.

Deal Breakers

If there are areas in which no compromise is likely to satisfy minimum requirements of both sides, then that fact should be acknowledged publicly.

Many people already suspect that finding a mutually acceptable division of Jerusalem is a chimera. The question of the “right of return” of Palestinians to their pre-1948 homes may likewise be unsolvable within the paradigm of a two-state solution. Trading off an unpalatable bargain regarding Jerusalem for an equally repugnant result regarding refugees may not be the answer either. Stateless Palestinians living in refugee camps in Lebanon need to have their personal, familial, and communal concerns addressed. Having a Palestinian flag fly over the Dome of the Rock does not accomplish that.

If Jerusalem, the right of return, or some other issue does turn out to be a deal breaker, then a conflict management strategy should continue to claim the full attention of a special envoy to the region. However, a secretary of state’s time or certainly that of the president should be sparingly used if the problem turns out not to be ripe for resolution.

Forcing it, as President Clinton tried to do at Camp David II, won’t work. By contrast, pressing parties that are anxious for a deal did work for President Carter at Camp David I, and it just might work for President Obama at a Camp David III.

by Michael Lame, posted on December 19, 2009

“B plus.” That was President Obama’s response when asked in a recent interview to grade his own performance after almost one year in office. Thus the floodgates opened for every commentator and op-ed writer around the world to grade our president.

Walter Russell Mead – author, scholar, and fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations – just gave Obama an overall grade of B-, for both foreign and domestic policy. But regarding the Middle East, Mead was less impressed: “Israel-Palestine: D This was a complete screw up. The only reason it isn’t an F is that there’s still time to do better.”

Indeed, there is time. 2009 was only the first year of four or eight for the Obama administration. A key question for 2010 is whether America continues to pursue the same policy (or lack thereof) regarding Arab-Israeli-Palestinian conflict or whether it tries something new. One could argue that we just need to keep on keepin’ on in order for Special Envoy Mitchell’s efforts to eventually pan out, but I doubt that course of action will prove effective.

None of the parties are cooperating as the administration had hoped, and even if somehow negotiations are resumed, the gaps are still very wide between Israeli and Palestinian positions, not just on details but on fundamental principles. And even if the leaders on both sides reach agreement, a deal will require popular assent, probably through the mechanism of a referendum. The Palestinian and Israeli peoples are not sheep. Their support for policies announced by their governments cannot be taken for granted.

Nor is consensus on either side to be hoped for. Why should we imagine that other national communities can find internal common ground when Americans cannot? Is there consensus among Americans regarding health care reform, economic recovery, the war in Afghanistan, climate change? No. Not even close.

Americans are a people divided about the most critical matters. So are Israelis. So are Palestinians. Months of intense debate on health care has resulted not in consensus or compromise but rather in ever sharper criticism and acrimony. We should not expect that the efforts of Israeli and Palestinian politicians less eloquent than Obama will succeed in persuading their people to agree on issues that have been in contention for decades.

So, for what they’re worth, here are some suggestions for re-thinking and re-tooling America’s approach to the conflict between Jews and Arabs in the Middle East:

Re-think the context. Beyond peace treaties, what is a desirable future relationship that we wish to foster between Israelis and Palestinians? Between Israelis and their neighbors in Lebanon, Syria, Jordan, and Egypt? Between Israelis and Arabs from Morocco to Iraq? How would such a relationship manifest itself, not only in blunt actions by administrators and soldiers, but also in the subtler interplay of gesture and word? How will respect be shown by political leaders and businessmen? What changes in behavior now can help modify attitudes in the future?

To put it in business terms, what are the critical success factors for developing that positive future relationship? What must occur for Arabs to be willing to accept Israel? What must occur for Israel to be willing to return most or all of the Golan to Syria? What must occur for Israel to be willing to relinquish control of most or all of the West Bank and to lift the siege of Gaza?

It may be that what must occur from an Arab perspective is incompatible with what must occur from an Israeli perspective. One hopes that is not the case, but diplomacy should be based on realistic expectations as well as hopes.

Re-think the process. What is the appropriate role for the United States? Go-between? Facilitator? Mediator? The term “honest broker” is presented as if it implies neutrality, but the U.S. has never been neutral when it comes to Israel. Israel is a strategic ally of the United States. Neither the PLO nor the PA has ever been a U.S. ally.

If neutrality is the desired attribute of a facilitator working in the Middle East, then the parties should look to the Swiss or the Swedes, not to the Americans. No, the reason the world looks to the US to broker a deal is precisely because of its close relationship to Israel. Only the U.S. is trusted by Israel. Only the U.S. can make promises to Israel that Israel is willing to rely upon. Only the U.S. can offer sufficient carrots and sticks that could move the Israeli body politic.

Who are America’s essential partners in attempting to bring peace to the region? Does the notion of “the Quartet” and its composition (US, EU, UN, and Russia) still make sense? What, if anything, do the Russians bring to the party? What about the role of individual Arab states such as Saudi Arabia? What about the Arab League? And what of Turkey?

Are Israeli-Palestinian bilateral negotiations the best approach for the U.S. to promote? Obviously Israel has much greater leverage than does the PA. What could shift the power differential in a way that moves the parties towards resolution of their differences? Can the PA reach an agreement about Jerusalem on its own, without involving the wider Arab world or the still broader Muslim global community? Does it need “cover” or the backing of other states in order either to compromise or to effectively stand up to Israel in the negotiations?

Certainly Egypt and Jordan have their own basic concerns about the creation of a new neighboring Palestinian state. Imagine how the dynamics would change if they were parties to the negotiations. Would that be productive – more productive than leaving it to the Palestinians and Israelis to go it alone?

Re-think the content. Should the U.S. continue to promote a two-state solution to the exclusion of all other possible solutions? The Palestinians may remain as divided next year or five years from now as they are today, so it might prove useful to begin exploring some alternatives, e.g., a West Bank Palestinian state; a Palestinian-Jordanian federation or confederation; an international trusteeship for Gaza and/or the West Bank; a special bi-national or international regime for Jerusalem.

Contingency planning is basic to business and to government. If the two-state solution remains elusive, what else can be done? After all, it is rarely the case in human affairs that there is only one viable solution to a problem, partisan protests notwithstanding.

Should the U.S. at some point put on the table its own proposed solution or set of bridging proposals? Simply mouthing over and over again, as George Mitchell did as recently as December 1st, that “We are committed to a viable, independent and contiguous Palestinian state and a Jewish state of Israel with secure and recognized borders” does not help deal with the nitty-gritty of land swaps, sovereignty in Jerusalem, border controls, overflight rights, refugees, etc.

I’ve just asked some broad questions. In my next posting I’ll suggest a few, hopefully provocative, specific do’s and don’ts for the new year.

As 2009 draws to a close, what grade do you give the president for his first year in office in dealing with Israelis and Palestinians? What, if anything, does the president and his foreign policy team need to re-think in order to produce more tangible results in the coming year?