RE-THINK THE MIDDLE EAST

by Michael Lame, posted on May 31, 2010

“A political provocation” – that was the term used by Israeli Defense Minister Ehud Barak to describe the flotilla of boats carrying supplies and activists to Gaza. The flotilla certainly provoked the IDF. Israeli commandos boarded the ships in a bloody operation that resulted in the deaths of at least nine activists and the wounding of dozens more, in addition to several Israeli wounded.

A political provocation must not be confused with a military one. North Korea torpedoed a South Korean military vessel, killing 46 sailors. That was a military provocation. Palestinian militants seized Gilad Shalit. That was a military provocation. Demonstrating in front of the White House is not a military provocation. Nor is protesting the eviction of Palestinian families from houses in Sheikh Jarrah in east Jerusalem. Nor is attempting to bring consumer supplies into Gaza. A decent government, especially a democratic government, must distinguish between actions that challenge its policy and those which endanger lives. Political provocations should not be addressed with lethal force. Military provocations are another matter.

Regardless of one’s position on the legitimacy and efficacy of Israel’s blockade of Gaza, Israel’s military action against the flotilla, which resulted in the killing of those trying to break that blockade and bring in supplies, was morally wrong. It was also stupid.

Even if there were weapons on board one or more of the ships, even if the Israeli commandos, as they descended by rope from helicopters hovering overhead, were attacked by activists with clubs and knives, even if the activists fired at the commandos, and even if they fired first, the question still remains: Was it necessary for the Israelis to board the ships? If there was going to be a violent confrontation, it would occur during boarding. The risk of resistance resulting in violence needed to be weighed by the Israeli decision-makers against all possible alternatives, including letting the ships go through or physically blocking them.

Israel’s justification of its actions is the claim that its soldiers were attacked when they boarded the ship. In other words, they acted in self-defense. But again, did they have to board?

The Israeli government and military are often tone-deaf in their dealings with a world which does not necessarily have their best interests at heart. But this disastrous sea battle reflects more than Israeli PR ineptitude. If the Israeli military – as well as the police and border patrol – showed the same restraint and reluctance to use deadly force in dealing with non-Jews as they do with Jews, these deaths would not have occurred. In 2005, Israel forcibly evicted thousands of Jews from settlements in Gaza and the West Bank. There were clashes and injuries, but no one died. That was not a matter of luck but rather of extensive military planning for all contingencies and a firm commitment not to shed blood.

Doesn’t anyone in a leadership position in Israel remember the Exodus, the ship that in 1947 carried Jewish refugees from Europe to Palestine? The British were blockading the coast at the time to prevent illegal immigrants from arriving in the country. Their navy intercepted the Exodus in international waters, some twenty miles from the Gaza coast. The British rammed the ship and then boarded it. Some of the passengers and crew resisted. The Royal Marines opened fire. Three Jews died. Twenty eight more were later hospitalized. The ship was towed into Haifa harbor and the passengers were forcibly disembarked. All of this transpired while UNSCOP (the United Nations Special Committee on Palestine) was in the country, investigating the situation prior to making a recommendation to the General Assembly. The Exodus affair had a profound impact on the committee and helped to shape its majority report in favor of the creation of a Jewish state alongside an Arab one in Palestine.

The tragic fate of this flotilla could similarly shape world opinion and international action. If Israel remains unwilling to alter its Gaza policy, then it will face dire consequences. In any case this incident will cost Israel dearly. Its already tarnished image in the world is much further damaged. Israel’s governmental relations with Turkey have been deteriorating ever since Operation Cast Lead. This hostile and lethal boarding of a Turkish ship will result in even greater alienation of the one non-Arab country in the region that was once friendly to the Jewish state. Israel’s relations with countries and institutions around the world will be adversely impacted by this preventable act of violence.

Rather than attempt to defend its actions, which government ministers and spokespeople are already doing, Israel should acknowledge its incompetence and wrongdoing in this case. Ministers’ and generals’ heads should roll (figuratively speaking). If there was ever a time for the president and the prime minister of Israel – on behalf of the government, the IDF, and the state – to issue a sincere and public mea culpa, this is that time. Please, Israel, don’t try to defend the indefensible. Acknowledge it and learn from it.

by Michael Lame, posted January 19, 2010

Punishing the Gazans

I attended a panel discussion on Gaza at the Brookings Institution last week. The panelists eloquently depicted the suffering of the more than one million Palestinians living in Gaza under the siege-like restrictions imposed by the Israelis and Egyptians.

One of the panelists pointed out that this is a clear-cut case of collective punishment, since all the people of Gaza are adversely affected – not just the Hamas establishment and Islamic Jihad militants. Many varieties of foodstuffs cannot be imported. Building materials for reconstruction are prohibited. Movement of people in and out of the Gaza Strip is severely restricted. Unemployment is rampant, as is malnutrition.

Since collective punishment is widely assumed to be unethical, the Brookings panel members duly condemned the Israelis for imposing the closure and urged the US government to insist that its ally raise the siege.

But that’s not really the end of the story. Let’s ask ourselves: Is collective punishment always wrong? Or should we even entertain this question, given that according to international humanitarian law, i.e., the laws of war, collective punishment is a war crime?

Geneva Conventions

What exactly is “collective punishment”? The term does not appear in the Hague Conventions or in the original Geneva Conventions. Article 33 of the Fourth Geneva Convention, adopted on August 12, 1949, states that:

“No protected person may be punished for an offence he or she has not personally committed. Collective penalties and likewise all measures of intimidation or of terrorism are prohibited. . . Reprisals against protected persons and their property are prohibited.”

Here we have “punished” in one sentence and “collective penalties” in the next. In 1977, Article 4 of Additional Protocol II to the Geneva Conventions put these words together and specifically prohibited “collective punishments”, though the term was not defined in that document. Note: Neither the United States nor Israel has ratified this protocol, though both are signatories to the 1949 Geneva Conventions.

“Collective punishment” generally refers to taking action against an entire group in response to the behavior of one or more individuals. Moreover, the offending individuals are not necessarily members of the group being punished. Collective punishment, then, consists of penalizing all members of a group, whether innocent or guilty of any hostile act.

The Geneva Conventions’ prohibition on collective punishment is limited in its application to war between countries as well as to people living under occupation. Additional Protocol II specifically concerns civilians in “non-international armed conflicts”, such as an insurrection (or an intifada).

Just as generals are said to always fight the previous war, so human rights activists try to protect people from the horrors experienced in the last armed conflict. The Geneva Conventions were written in the wake of the Second World War, with the particular atrocities of that conflict fresh in the drafters’ minds.

WWII examples of collective punishment and reprisals include the infamous 1942 case of Lidice, a Czech village that was obliterated, its entire adult male population executed, and its women and children sent to concentration camps. All this was in retaliation for the assassination of Reinhard Heydrich, a high-ranking murderous Nazi official. The assassins had no connection to the village.

The designation “collective punishment”, in principle and practice, may be applied more broadly and less lethally than in such WWII examples.

War itself is collective punishment. It adversely affects entire populations, regardless of their political affiliation or personal responsibility for any governmental acts of aggression. And war doesn’t just kill individuals. It kills groups. It kills collectively. Even a just war collectively punishes the innocent along with the guilty.

Is collective punishment ever justified?

Sanctions are collective punishment (though not within the confines of the Geneva Conventions). The world community supported sanctions against South Africa in order to end apartheid. Those sanctions hurt the South African economy, causing a deep recession. As every American knows in today’s difficult economic situation, when the economy suffers, people suffer. South Africans, black and white, were adversely affected by the sanctions and boycotts. But given the great evil that apartheid was considered to be, the world was willing to countenance the economic dislocation caused to the people of South Africa.

Collective punishment can refer to the treatment of an entire population, as in the current siege-like restrictions placed on Gaza, or to an entire country, as in the decades-old Arab boycott or in the new international campaign for boycotts, divestment, and sanctions against Israel. These Middle East examples again raise the question of whether this can be a morally acceptable tactic to use in attempting to change a political actor’s behavior.

One justification for such action is summed up neatly by Shakespeare when Bassanio urges the court in The Merchant of Venice, “To do a great right, do a little wrong…”

Since collective punishment can take many different forms in many different contexts, one can support it or oppose it on a case-by-case basis. For example, some might support collectively punishing an entire community which they consider to be oppressive, such as apartheid-era South Africa or today’s Sudan, while opposing the collective punishment of what they consider oppressed communities, such as the Palestinians.

Even after the 1977 additions, the Geneva Conventions are just that – conventions, political agreements on customs, practices, and usages, rather than definitive moral pronouncements. No matter how much such documents written in The Hague and Geneva might be revered, they are not sacred texts but rather the fallible and mutable work of the human heart and mind. Therefore these documents can be questioned, challenged, disputed, and at times even ignored.

If and when Israelis and Palestinians reach a mutually acceptable agreement, it may or may not conform to UN Security Council resolutions or other sources of international law. The only question that will matter at that point is whether the two sides are willing to live with their agreement.

I suggest that collective punishment should not automatically be ruled out as a justified means of applying pressure, whether inside or outside of the Geneva Convention parameters. Before employing it, one must examine several factors: the legitimacy of the purpose; the particular form employed, the severity of the effect, the length of the application, and the likelihood of success.

If an instance of collective punishment is justifiable, then it ought to be possible to publically communicate that in a persuasive fashion. If no one can clearly articulate why collective punishment is being applied and what the intended result is, then chances are it is indefensible. In this particular case the burden is on Israel to show convincingly why the restrictions on Gaza exist and how long they will continue.

Ending the Gazan stalemate

A way must be found to normalize life for the Gazans, without further endangering the Israelis. In this case, both sides want something they don’t currently have.

Israelis want Gilad Shalit returned. They want the risk of future rocket attacks reduced, if not eliminated. And they want a Gazan interlocutor willing to accept Israel.

Gazans want the economic and travel restrictions permanently lifted, a chance to rebuild from the damage done a year ago in Operation Cast Lead, the release of Palestinian prisoners from Israeli jails, an open passageway to the West Bank, the world’s acceptance of the political leaders they choose, and independence.

Regardless of the Geneva Conventions, neither side is likely to alter its behavior without at least some of its wants being met. If George Mitchell can help the Palestinians and Israelis mutually achieve some of their goals regarding Gaza, then this awful stalemate may come to an end. Such a limited achievement will not resolve the conflict but it could put an end to the collective punishment of people in Gaza.

by Michael Lame, posted on December 29, 2009

At the end of my last posting, I wrote that in Part 2 “ I’ll suggest a few, hopefully provocative, specific do’s and don’ts for the new year.”

Each and every one of the following suggestions has a downside to it. Each can be dismissed as “unrealistic” because one or another side currently finds it objectionable. That is also true of the most popular ideas now in circulation. A two-state solution, for example, has major downsides for both peoples.

So far, no proposal or process has succeeded in resolving Palestinian-Israeli conflict. Nothing has worked. That fact alone should give us pause, providing the basis for some humility and a wee bit of uncertainty about the likelihood that anyone knows the answer to the problem.

So let’s start the new year by examining, newly and freshly, different ways of viewing the conflict, different ways of addressing it, and different proposed solutions for it.

For what they are worth, here are my 2010 suggestions to President Obama, Secretary Clinton, and Special Envoy Mitchell for re-thinking and re-tooling America’s approach to this conflict. No attempt has been made to insure that this list is either comprehensive or balanced.

What Not to Do

Let’s start with what not to do, or rather, what not to say:

1) Stop talking about 242 and 338. They are out of date and out of juice.

2) Stop talking about the Road Map. It’s a map that neither side wanted and neither side has followed.

3)  Stop talking about land for peace. The Palestinians need more than land in order to build a state. The Israelis need more than a peace treaty in order to sleep soundly at night.

4)  Stop talking about a commitment to a Palestinian state, but don’t stop working towards it. It’s still unclear if that circle can be squared. To be so publicly committed to such an iffy proposition is not wise foreign policy. This is the United States. We don’t get points internationally for trying. We should commit ourselves to what we can deliver, and we cannot guarantee success in forcing two unwilling peoples to make peace.

5)  Stop talking about getting the parties back to the negotiating table as soon as possible. As we saw with the collapse of the Camp David II talks in 2000, talks that aren’t well prepared for and that don’t have a reasonable likelihood of success can lead not only to failure but also to the outbreak of deadly violence.

What productive actions could the U.S. take in 2010?

Refugees

An unconscionably large number of Palestinians have no citizenship or passports. The United States should explore constructive ways to address this problem without waiting for it to be dealt with in final status negotiations. After all, no one knows if or when such negotiations will take place or prove productive. The Palestinian refugees and their descendants should no longer be held hostage to the “peace process”.

The United States could create a taskforce – completely separate from the Mitchell team – to work towards ending that condition of statelessness. The idea here is to directly tackle perhaps the most tragic aspect of the conflict. In doing so, it must be made clear by the U.S. government that Palestinian acceptance of citizenship from any country in the world will not adversely affect the political or economic rights of Palestinians regarding their status as Palestinians or their original homes in Palestine.

The West Bank

The settlement freeze issue was so mucked up by the administration this year that it’s probably best not to make it a focal point of its efforts in 2010.

Instead, insist (and verify) that the Israelis significantly accelerate the pace of reducing the number of roadblocks and checkpoints and take other measurable, substantive actions to ease personal travel and commercial transportation in the West Bank. These are some of many steps needed to promote economic development and personal freedom for the Palestinian community in the West Bank.

Gaza

The Gazan population is largely cut off from the rest of the world. Travel is severely restricted. A very limited list of foodstuffs and other products is allowed in by the Israelis. Under these conditions, reconstruction is impossible. Hamas and Israel have been stalemated since January. The people of Gaza are the losers. The winners are the Israeli residents of Sderot and other nearby communities that are no longer shelled from Gaza.

Once the prisoner exchange is completed, the US should insist that Israel significantly relax the siege of Gaza, provided that the shelling of Israel does not begin again.

Re-Assess the Likelihood of a Negotiated Settlement

Through discussions with the Palestinian Authority, the Israeli government, and other Palestinian and Israeli players, U.S. officials should delineate as precisely as possible the remaining gaps between Palestinian and Israeli positions on all issues (not just the “big four” of security, borders, refugees, and Jerusalem). These sticky issues include, among others: the disposition of West Bank settlements and settlers outside the areas which will likely be retained by Israel; economic relations between Israel and Palestine; water management; Gaza-West Bank links; and ending incitement.

Act on the Assessment

Based on the current gaps between the parties and the history of those gaps, assess whether any meeting of the minds between Israelis and Palestinians is a real likelihood by 2012 or by 2016. If not, switch gears from conflict resolution mode to conflict management mode.

If the assessment results in the conclusion that a deal is a real likelihood in the next few years, then formulate a set of questions for each side regarding a range of compromise options most likely to bring about a resolution of the conflict. (This is distinctly different from the US preparing a set of bridging proposals of its own on how to end the conflict.)

Formally and publicly ask these questions of both sides.

Encourage the Israelis to open up more public debate in Israel regarding these questions and regarding the specific likely sacrifices that will be necessary to reach a deal with the Palestinians.

Encourage the Palestinians to open up more public debate within Palestinian communities across the Middle East regarding these questions and regarding the likely sacrifices that will be necessary for reaching a deal with the Israelis.

Israelis and Palestinians live in highly politicized communities. If their leaders are to make painful concessions for peace, the groundwork must be laid with the populace. For the US to make an appeal to the people on both sides to grapple with the most difficult issues is an attempt to engage the two nations in moving towards a mutually beneficial arrangement – at least a modus vivendi, if not a peace treaty.

Deal Breakers

If there are areas in which no compromise is likely to satisfy minimum requirements of both sides, then that fact should be acknowledged publicly.

Many people already suspect that finding a mutually acceptable division of Jerusalem is a chimera. The question of the “right of return” of Palestinians to their pre-1948 homes may likewise be unsolvable within the paradigm of a two-state solution. Trading off an unpalatable bargain regarding Jerusalem for an equally repugnant result regarding refugees may not be the answer either. Stateless Palestinians living in refugee camps in Lebanon need to have their personal, familial, and communal concerns addressed. Having a Palestinian flag fly over the Dome of the Rock does not accomplish that.

If Jerusalem, the right of return, or some other issue does turn out to be a deal breaker, then a conflict management strategy should continue to claim the full attention of a special envoy to the region. However, a secretary of state’s time or certainly that of the president should be sparingly used if the problem turns out not to be ripe for resolution.

Forcing it, as President Clinton tried to do at Camp David II, won’t work. By contrast, pressing parties that are anxious for a deal did work for President Carter at Camp David I, and it just might work for President Obama at a Camp David III.

[Note: The views expressed in this blog are solely those of the author and do not represent the views of Re-Think the Middle East.]

Michael Lame, posted August 31, 2009

Two facts are incontrovertible, for the time being: 1) Hamas rules Gaza; and 2) Hamas is one of the two strongest Palestinian political parties. Two other current facts may not be facts for long: 3) the United States refuses to officially recognize or talk directly with Hamas; and 4) Israel refuses too.

The U.S., the E.U., the U.N., and Russia, as well as Israel, all demand that Hamas fulfill three pre-conditions for dealing with the international community. As President Obama re-stated the conditions in his Cairo speech, “Hamas must put an end to violence, recognize past agreements, and recognize Israel’s right to exist.”

Hamas respectfully declines to meet these terms, countering that it is unclear which Israel it is being asked to recognize (pre- or post-’67), that Fatah’s recognition of Israel has not produced results for the Palestinians, that Hamas will accept all prior agreements that serve the Palestinian people, that Israel has not renounced violence, and that the Palestinians, as a people living under occupation, have the inherent right to resist by whatever means necessary. In short, there is no meeting of the minds on the three pre-conditions, and consequently there are no direct talks.

The absence of official dialogue, however, has not prevented Israel and Hamas from engaging in indirect negotiations through the Egyptians on terms for the release of Israeli soldier Gilad Shalit, held by Hamas or a Hamas affiliate since June 2006. Nor is the U.S. position devoid of flexibility. In recent months, several Americans with close ties to the Obama Administration have met with Hamas officials. So, one can say that channels of communication among the various players are open and utilized.

Hamas clearly wants recognition from and dialogue with the United States, but is it interested in direct negotiations with Israel? I heard a Palestinian scholar recently state that there is no Islamic bar to speaking with one’s enemies and therefore Hamas could choose to have its representatives sit down with Israeli officials. We know that Hamas has set its own pre-conditions for a long-term hudna or truce with the Israelis: complete withdrawal to the ’67 borders, acceptance of the right of return, and release of all Palestinian prisoners. This constitutes a non-starter for the Israelis, and Hamas must know that. Is there a moral/political calculus that prevents Hamas leaders from talking directly with Israeli leaders? We don’t really know, and we may not know unless Israel makes the first move.

Should the United States deal directly and officially with Hamas? Should Israel?

Communication is crucial to peace-making. One could say that communication is a necessary condition for conflict resolution, though not a sufficient one. That doesn’t mean that everyone needs to talk to everyone else or that requests for dialogue should always be accepted.

Non-communication is Communication
People frequently forget that one fundamental and legitimate form of communication is non-communication. Silence speaks volumes. The refusal to talk with someone unless or until that person fulfills certain conditions is a common human practice. We might stop talking to former friends because they have offended us in some way. We might refuse to sit at the same table with a particular party until they have apologized or explained themselves, retracted a statement or changed their behavior. Sometimes we’ve simply heard enough, and if there is nothing new to be added, there is no point in continuing the conversation. We stop talking. We stop listening.

No one has an inherent right to be listened to, and no one has an inherent obligation to listen. The world is certainly a more pleasant place when we are willing to listen and speak to others, but shunning is a very old social practice, and it can be a useful one.

The United States government and the Israeli government are not obligated to speak with Hamas simply because Hamas represents a significant portion of the Palestinian population. But we can ask the questions: Is it currently more beneficial for the U.S. to dialogue with Hamas or to refrain from such dialogue? Is it constructive at this time for Israel to talk with Hamas? Would it be more constructive to wait until certain changes occur – in Hamas’s language or actions, in its status, in its relations with Fatah? These are practical political questions.

For some, these are also moral questions, One can ask: If Americans care at all about the people of Gaza, who are experiencing severe deprivation, then how can the U.S. refuse to speak with the only de facto (if not also de jure) political authority in the Gaza Strip, i.e., Hamas? If the Americans truly value democracy, how can they refuse to sit down with the undisputed winners of a free and fair election, i.e., Hamas?

But the moral issues cut both ways. Sometimes the refusal to talk to a party is heralded as standing up for one’s moral or political principles. When a political figure espouses policies which one abhors, is it immoral to meet with that person? Or might it be moral to meet in private and unofficially but immoral to meet in public, since a public and publicized meeting runs the risk of being seen as approval or support?

The Middle East has more than its share of morally-challenged leaders. Ahmadinejad is a Holocaust-denier who imprisons his opponents. Sudan’s president Omar al-Bashir has been indicted for war crimes and crimes against humanity in Darfur. Sharon was forced to resign as Israel’s Defense Minister for his role in the Sabra and Shatila massacre.

Do you – should you – refuse to meet with such people, whose views or actions you find reprehensible? Does meeting with someone mean that you agree with their views? Of course not, though the world may construe it that way. We each make judgment calls. We each set different limits for how much contact, if any, is too much. Some people criticized President Obama not for meeting Hugo Chavez but for smiling during the meeting. Sharon never shook hands with Arafat, but Netanyahu did. Acts signify. A smile is often interpreted as friendliness. A handshake can be seen as a sign of respect, even trust.

The decision to talk or meet with an adversary is not a matter of applying a universal principle universally. It must be taken on a case-by-case basis, and each case can change over time. For example, at the beginning of the year, active U.S. engagement with the Iranian regime seemed to many to be long overdue. Now, just a few months later, in the aftermath of a fraudulent election and a crackdown on dissidents, any eager outreach to the Khamenei-Ahmadinejad regime appears unseemly.

Blood on their Hands
One argument for Israeli officials not to meet with Hamas is that Hamas members have “Jewish blood on their hands.” Indeed they do. Hamas has sent dozens of suicide bombers into Israel’s cities, causing indiscriminate mayhem. Hamas has launched thousands of rockets against Israeli cities and towns, targeting civilian populations.

It is also true that Israeli political and military leaders have much Palestinian blood on their hands. In December and January alone, during the fighting in Gaza, Israeli soldiers killing more than 1,000 men, women, and children.

In this hundred years war, thousands from both sides have killed and been killed. Yet when vital national interests are at stake, the odds are that leaders will be willing to meet, regardless of who has blood on his hands.

The moral stance of refusing to talk to or meet with an enemy who has perpetrated crimes against one’s people is understandable, perhaps even laudable. The moral imperative of speaking with that same enemy in order to prevent one’s people from suffering further harm – that too is understandable, perhaps even wise, though one’s constituents may disagree. Leaders who decide not to meet with their enemies can easily be labeled “intransigent” or “short-sighted”, while those who agree to meet can be attacked as “appeasers” and “sell-outs”.

These two sets of moral/political considerations must be weighed even as they clash against each other. The shifting balance of factors may yield different decisions at different points in time. Especially in the Middle East, today’s rejection may be followed by tomorrow’s embrace.

[Next blog posting: Talking with Hamas, Part 2]