RE-THINK THE MIDDLE EAST

by Michael Lame, posted on May 30, 2010

Who says Hamas doesn’t have a sense of humor?

On May 27, Charlie Rose interviewed Khaled Meshaal, the Damascus-based Hamas leader, and the interview was broadcast the following day. Al-Manar, the satellite television station of Hezbollah published an article about the interview on its website. Although the article appears there without attribution, in fact it was lifted in its entirety from the website of the Israeli newspaper Haaretz, and was penned by the paper’s US-based journalist Natasha Mozgovaya.

Here’s the funny part from Mozgovaya’s article about Rose’s interview with Meshaal:

The Hamas leader urged the U.S. to provide his militant movement with technologically advanced missiles “so we can use them very accurately against military targets and not civilians,” and denied that Hamas hides its rockets amongst civilians.

Hamas wants the United States to provide it with advanced missile technology so that it can kill more Israeli soldiers and leave Israeli civilians unharmed. Actually, a shift from shooting, rocketing, and blowing up Israeli non-combatants to exclusively killing military personnel would make good PR sense for Hamas. World public opinion is more easily exercised over the killing of civilians – especially women and children – than it is by the death of soldiers. And targeting civilians is often seen as the hallmark of terrorism. By exclusively targeting the IDF, the terrorist label would not stick so easily to Hamas.

The United States, of course, as an ally of Israel, will not provide such technology to Hamas, but others might.

Here is more of what Meshaal said to Rose on the subject:

The rockets are a Palestinian reaction for self-defense. . . What would the Palestinians do? They do not have developed American arms, so what do they do? They just manufacture these primitive weapons in order to defend themselves. This is an expression of self-defense that we still are alive and we will not be subject to the Israeli. . . We do not want to target the Israeli civilians, but our rockets are not accurate. Our rockets are not modern, are not developed. I call upon the American administration to give Hamas modern rockets so we can use them very accurately against military targets and not civilians. . . We are against targeting any innocent person. . . Any operations targeting civilians, innocent people, are condemned.

From the video of the interview, it appeared that Meshaal’s request for U.S. military aid was delivered with a straight face. Seriousness or deadpan humor? Perhaps both. There is a sort of Swiftian twisted logic to a Hamas request for missile technology from the United States.

In a list of Khaled Meshaal interviews, this was not the best or most revealing, but it certainly produced one surreal moment, and for that, Charlie Rose is to be thanked.

by Michael Lame, posted on December 29, 2009

At the end of my last posting, I wrote that in Part 2 “ I’ll suggest a few, hopefully provocative, specific do’s and don’ts for the new year.”

Each and every one of the following suggestions has a downside to it. Each can be dismissed as “unrealistic” because one or another side currently finds it objectionable. That is also true of the most popular ideas now in circulation. A two-state solution, for example, has major downsides for both peoples.

So far, no proposal or process has succeeded in resolving Palestinian-Israeli conflict. Nothing has worked. That fact alone should give us pause, providing the basis for some humility and a wee bit of uncertainty about the likelihood that anyone knows the answer to the problem.

So let’s start the new year by examining, newly and freshly, different ways of viewing the conflict, different ways of addressing it, and different proposed solutions for it.

For what they are worth, here are my 2010 suggestions to President Obama, Secretary Clinton, and Special Envoy Mitchell for re-thinking and re-tooling America’s approach to this conflict. No attempt has been made to insure that this list is either comprehensive or balanced.

What Not to Do

Let’s start with what not to do, or rather, what not to say:

1) Stop talking about 242 and 338. They are out of date and out of juice.

2) Stop talking about the Road Map. It’s a map that neither side wanted and neither side has followed.

3)  Stop talking about land for peace. The Palestinians need more than land in order to build a state. The Israelis need more than a peace treaty in order to sleep soundly at night.

4)  Stop talking about a commitment to a Palestinian state, but don’t stop working towards it. It’s still unclear if that circle can be squared. To be so publicly committed to such an iffy proposition is not wise foreign policy. This is the United States. We don’t get points internationally for trying. We should commit ourselves to what we can deliver, and we cannot guarantee success in forcing two unwilling peoples to make peace.

5)  Stop talking about getting the parties back to the negotiating table as soon as possible. As we saw with the collapse of the Camp David II talks in 2000, talks that aren’t well prepared for and that don’t have a reasonable likelihood of success can lead not only to failure but also to the outbreak of deadly violence.

What productive actions could the U.S. take in 2010?

Refugees

An unconscionably large number of Palestinians have no citizenship or passports. The United States should explore constructive ways to address this problem without waiting for it to be dealt with in final status negotiations. After all, no one knows if or when such negotiations will take place or prove productive. The Palestinian refugees and their descendants should no longer be held hostage to the “peace process”.

The United States could create a taskforce – completely separate from the Mitchell team – to work towards ending that condition of statelessness. The idea here is to directly tackle perhaps the most tragic aspect of the conflict. In doing so, it must be made clear by the U.S. government that Palestinian acceptance of citizenship from any country in the world will not adversely affect the political or economic rights of Palestinians regarding their status as Palestinians or their original homes in Palestine.

The West Bank

The settlement freeze issue was so mucked up by the administration this year that it’s probably best not to make it a focal point of its efforts in 2010.

Instead, insist (and verify) that the Israelis significantly accelerate the pace of reducing the number of roadblocks and checkpoints and take other measurable, substantive actions to ease personal travel and commercial transportation in the West Bank. These are some of many steps needed to promote economic development and personal freedom for the Palestinian community in the West Bank.

Gaza

The Gazan population is largely cut off from the rest of the world. Travel is severely restricted. A very limited list of foodstuffs and other products is allowed in by the Israelis. Under these conditions, reconstruction is impossible. Hamas and Israel have been stalemated since January. The people of Gaza are the losers. The winners are the Israeli residents of Sderot and other nearby communities that are no longer shelled from Gaza.

Once the prisoner exchange is completed, the US should insist that Israel significantly relax the siege of Gaza, provided that the shelling of Israel does not begin again.

Re-Assess the Likelihood of a Negotiated Settlement

Through discussions with the Palestinian Authority, the Israeli government, and other Palestinian and Israeli players, U.S. officials should delineate as precisely as possible the remaining gaps between Palestinian and Israeli positions on all issues (not just the “big four” of security, borders, refugees, and Jerusalem). These sticky issues include, among others: the disposition of West Bank settlements and settlers outside the areas which will likely be retained by Israel; economic relations between Israel and Palestine; water management; Gaza-West Bank links; and ending incitement.

Act on the Assessment

Based on the current gaps between the parties and the history of those gaps, assess whether any meeting of the minds between Israelis and Palestinians is a real likelihood by 2012 or by 2016. If not, switch gears from conflict resolution mode to conflict management mode.

If the assessment results in the conclusion that a deal is a real likelihood in the next few years, then formulate a set of questions for each side regarding a range of compromise options most likely to bring about a resolution of the conflict. (This is distinctly different from the US preparing a set of bridging proposals of its own on how to end the conflict.)

Formally and publicly ask these questions of both sides.

Encourage the Israelis to open up more public debate in Israel regarding these questions and regarding the specific likely sacrifices that will be necessary to reach a deal with the Palestinians.

Encourage the Palestinians to open up more public debate within Palestinian communities across the Middle East regarding these questions and regarding the likely sacrifices that will be necessary for reaching a deal with the Israelis.

Israelis and Palestinians live in highly politicized communities. If their leaders are to make painful concessions for peace, the groundwork must be laid with the populace. For the US to make an appeal to the people on both sides to grapple with the most difficult issues is an attempt to engage the two nations in moving towards a mutually beneficial arrangement – at least a modus vivendi, if not a peace treaty.

Deal Breakers

If there are areas in which no compromise is likely to satisfy minimum requirements of both sides, then that fact should be acknowledged publicly.

Many people already suspect that finding a mutually acceptable division of Jerusalem is a chimera. The question of the “right of return” of Palestinians to their pre-1948 homes may likewise be unsolvable within the paradigm of a two-state solution. Trading off an unpalatable bargain regarding Jerusalem for an equally repugnant result regarding refugees may not be the answer either. Stateless Palestinians living in refugee camps in Lebanon need to have their personal, familial, and communal concerns addressed. Having a Palestinian flag fly over the Dome of the Rock does not accomplish that.

If Jerusalem, the right of return, or some other issue does turn out to be a deal breaker, then a conflict management strategy should continue to claim the full attention of a special envoy to the region. However, a secretary of state’s time or certainly that of the president should be sparingly used if the problem turns out not to be ripe for resolution.

Forcing it, as President Clinton tried to do at Camp David II, won’t work. By contrast, pressing parties that are anxious for a deal did work for President Carter at Camp David I, and it just might work for President Obama at a Camp David III.

Michael Lame, posted September 12, 2009

“No Pre-Conditions”

Once the mental and emotional threshold of being willing to meet with “the enemy” has been crossed, there remains the question of pre-conditions. Each party to a difficult negotiation would like to force the other party to make unreciprocated concessions prior to the start of talks. If you can make the other party fulfill your pre-conditions without having to fulfill theirs, then you have obtained something for nothing. You have successfully hoarded your bargaining chips.

The imposition or attempted imposition of pre-conditions is a bargaining tool. Yet, just as many people become exercised about speaking to “the enemy” at all, some will hold high the banner of “no pre-conditions” and call it a moral stance.

Whenever politicians – Americans, Iranians, Israelis, Palestinians, or others – call for talks “without preconditions,” you can be confident that they believe themselves to be in a strong bargaining position at the moment. It may sound like a principled stand, but it can also be explained in more Machiavellian terms. If Ahmadinejad calls for talks with the U.S. “without preconditions,” in effect that means that Iran will not slow down or stop its nuclear development program while it talks. The relevant sports term for that sort of behavior is “running out the clock.”

The stronger party will often insist on pre-conditions and will hold out for their fulfillment, if it can, by refusing to talk until and unless these conditions are met. But if the negotiation is of critical importance to the stronger party and the weaker party won’t give in, then some way needs to be found for the stronger party to climb down from its untenable position.

That is my interpretation of the current status of negotiations between Obama’s Middle East envoy George Mitchell and the Netanyahu government. Mitchell and Obama went out on a limb to insist that Israel freeze its settlement activity. If Israel agrees, then Obama wins points with one of his target audiences: Arab and Muslim nations.

As you may recall, in his Cairo speech Obama stated that “The United States does not accept the legitimacy of continued Israeli settlements. This construction violates previous agreements and undermines efforts to achieve peace. It is time for these settlements to stop.”

The Palestinian Authority (PA) government of Mahmoud Abbas is refusing to resume negotiations until and unless the Israelis cease all building activities in the West Bank and East Jerusalem. If, through U.S. pressure, Israel agrees to a freeze, even a partial one, then Abbas’s stock goes up in the Palestinian community for having stuck to his guns and produced results. Strengthening Fatah and the PA makes for a weaker Hamas, at least in the West Bank. But the PA only rules in the West Bank, and a settlement freeze there does nothing to help the people of Gaza. (More on this later.)

In negotiations between Israelis and Palestinians, the Israelis almost always have the upper hand. And they will use that power differential to try to extract as many concessions as possible before negotiations begin, e.g., Palestinian recognition of Israel as a Jewish state, renunciation of violence, a commitment to arrest terrorists, an end to media incitement, a stop to smuggling, disarming militants, giving up the right of return.

As best they can, the Palestinians will resist giving up anything without a quid pro quo. Nor are the Palestinians completely powerless in this game. Hamas still has many potential recruits for martyrdom missions/suicide bombings as well as an arsenal of missiles which can be launched into Israel. And Abbas says he will not participate in talks while the settlements continue to expand. Therein lies his leverage: Israel wants normalized relations with a wide circle of Arab countries, especially in the Gulf. An Arab pre-condition for expanding such commercial dealings is progress on the Palestinian track.

Negotiations currently in process with the Israelis will apparently soften the U.S. stance. Given the opposition to a building halt in Netanyahu’s coalition government, a full-out freeze is unlikely to occur. Some temporary semblance of a partial freeze may be agreed upon to allow Obama and Abbas to publically assert that they got what they wanted. Then the talks can begin again, without anything fundamental having changed.

To Talk or Not to Talk: That is the Question

For Israelis, the simple way of answering the question of whether to talk to Hamas is to dismiss all counter-arguments: “You don’t make peace with your friends; you make peace with your enemies, so let’s talk.” Alternatively: “They want us dead, so why talk?”

Talking has consequences, and one consequence is the perception of enhanced credibility and legitimacy bestowed by the act of formal contact. When delegates of a previously-shunned party – whether a state or a non-state actor – are photographed shaking hands with or sitting at a table opposite U.S. diplomats, that party’s international prestige rises. Its ability to recruit new members increases. It now has “a seat at the table.”

Not everyone should have a seat at the table.

The U.S. government has its own set of pros and cons regarding dialogue with Hamas. In 1975, then-Secretary of State Henry Kissinger committed the United States not to recognize or deal with the PLO until it met three conditions: acceptance of UN Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338, recognition of Israel’s right to exist, and renunciation of terrorism. Thirteen years later, in December 1988, after years of messages passed back and forth and internal PLO debate, Arafat expressly met these conditions. Secretary of State George Shultz acknowledged it, and an official dialogue opened between the PLO and the U.S.

Might the same happen with Hamas? Could the pre-conditions insisted upon by the Quartet – Russia, the E.U., the U.N., and the U.S. – provide some impetus, along with other factors, to spur a transformation of Hamas’s political position? And, if so, how long might that take and how much suffering must the people of Gaza endure while the U.S., Israel, and Hamas play out this waiting game?

Or will Hamas’s ideological roots in the Muslim Brotherhood and its own interpretation of Islam prevent it from ever accepting one square inch of sovereign Israeli territory in any part of Palestine?

We don’t yet know the answers to these questions, but as long as the stalemate on the ground continues, we should keep asking.

Several writers have recently argued that Hamas has already significantly evolved and that it no longer espouses the harsh ideology expressed in its notorious charter of 1988. It has become a pragmatic political party, they assert. Others say: Don’t be fooled; Hamas leaders are merely putting on a more moderate face for western audiences.

My guess is that schizophrenia reigns in Hamas circles, though not of the clinical kind: Yes, all of Palestine is ours, yet Israel is here to stay. No, Israel cannot be accepted, yet Israel cannot be defeated. Belief in such apparently contradictory positions can easily result in emphasizing different themes at different times, without any of the statements being false.

Gaza and the West Bank

Of course, there is a cost of not talking to Hamas, and that cost is largely borne by the people of Gaza, trapped by an Israeli blockade, subsisting on a limited diet, unable to repair the extensive damage from Israel’s incursion during Operation Cast Lead in January.

Israel will not allow the building materials necessary for reconstruction to be brought into Gaza. It claims that at least some of those supplies could be diverted to support Hamas’s arms’ buildup and construction of tunnels and bunkers. So, one purpose in initiating a direct U.S. dialogue with Hamas would be humanitarian – to help alleviate the suffering of the Palestinians locked up in the Gaza Strip.

A second purpose for talking to Hamas might be to encourage Hamas to reconcile with Fatah, join a unity government and jointly agree to hold open elections in both Hamas-controlled Gaza and the Fatah-controlled West Bank.

Many commentators insist that a unity government is the only way in which negotiations with Israel have a chance of success. They claim that Hamas as Fatah’s partner in a single Palestinian polity is far preferable to a Gaza/West Bank split or to Hamas remaining outside the government, where it could snipe and undermine any deal reached without its participation.

There is a counter-argument: Negotiations have proven difficult enough between the Fatah-dominated PLO and Israel. The inclusion of Hamas in a Palestinian government would seriously complicate the process and likely move the Palestinian negotiating position further away from one which any Israeli government could accept.

If the Quartet talks to Hamas without Hamas first meeting the pre-conditions, then Hamas will be seen to have won a battle of principled steadfastness in the face of severe international pressure. It will be strengthened as a result. Fatah will be weakened. The Quartet will look irresolute and fickle.

If Hamas meets the pre-conditions and then the talks begin, Hamas gains international recognition and credibility. But by acquiescing to the West’s demands, its reputation for refusing to compromise on matters of principle will be tarnished in the eyes of many Palestinian erstwhile supporters. And as we have seen recently in Gaza, Hamas needs to be concerned not only with fending off Fatah on one side of the political spectrum but also with threats from more radical Islamist organizations on the other. Just last month, Hamas used lethal force to suppress a challenge from one such group, Jund Ansar Allah.

In the West Bank, meanwhile, Israeli and American officials work with their Palestinian Authority counterparts on both a political and a military level. With Mahmoud Abbas as president and Salam Fayyad as prime minister, the PA is making significant strides forward on economic and security fronts. Whether this path will lead to Palestinian statehood, either de facto or de jure, is another matter. It is too soon to say.

Certainly this is a process that the Obama Administration wishes to encourage, and if a Palestinian election is to be held in January, 2010, as currently scheduled, then the U.S. would not want to take any action that could adversely affect the chances for Fatah to defeat Hamas at the polls. One such prejudicial action would be to open a public dialogue with Hamas, especially if Hamas did not first agree to the Quartet pre-conditions. Since the election, if held, is only a few months away, the argument for the U.S. holding its course probably outweighs all others.

[Note: The views expressed in this blog are solely those of the author and do not represent the views of Re-Think the Middle East.]

Michael Lame, posted August 31, 2009

Two facts are incontrovertible, for the time being: 1) Hamas rules Gaza; and 2) Hamas is one of the two strongest Palestinian political parties. Two other current facts may not be facts for long: 3) the United States refuses to officially recognize or talk directly with Hamas; and 4) Israel refuses too.

The U.S., the E.U., the U.N., and Russia, as well as Israel, all demand that Hamas fulfill three pre-conditions for dealing with the international community. As President Obama re-stated the conditions in his Cairo speech, “Hamas must put an end to violence, recognize past agreements, and recognize Israel’s right to exist.”

Hamas respectfully declines to meet these terms, countering that it is unclear which Israel it is being asked to recognize (pre- or post-’67), that Fatah’s recognition of Israel has not produced results for the Palestinians, that Hamas will accept all prior agreements that serve the Palestinian people, that Israel has not renounced violence, and that the Palestinians, as a people living under occupation, have the inherent right to resist by whatever means necessary. In short, there is no meeting of the minds on the three pre-conditions, and consequently there are no direct talks.

The absence of official dialogue, however, has not prevented Israel and Hamas from engaging in indirect negotiations through the Egyptians on terms for the release of Israeli soldier Gilad Shalit, held by Hamas or a Hamas affiliate since June 2006. Nor is the U.S. position devoid of flexibility. In recent months, several Americans with close ties to the Obama Administration have met with Hamas officials. So, one can say that channels of communication among the various players are open and utilized.

Hamas clearly wants recognition from and dialogue with the United States, but is it interested in direct negotiations with Israel? I heard a Palestinian scholar recently state that there is no Islamic bar to speaking with one’s enemies and therefore Hamas could choose to have its representatives sit down with Israeli officials. We know that Hamas has set its own pre-conditions for a long-term hudna or truce with the Israelis: complete withdrawal to the ’67 borders, acceptance of the right of return, and release of all Palestinian prisoners. This constitutes a non-starter for the Israelis, and Hamas must know that. Is there a moral/political calculus that prevents Hamas leaders from talking directly with Israeli leaders? We don’t really know, and we may not know unless Israel makes the first move.

Should the United States deal directly and officially with Hamas? Should Israel?

Communication is crucial to peace-making. One could say that communication is a necessary condition for conflict resolution, though not a sufficient one. That doesn’t mean that everyone needs to talk to everyone else or that requests for dialogue should always be accepted.

Non-communication is Communication
People frequently forget that one fundamental and legitimate form of communication is non-communication. Silence speaks volumes. The refusal to talk with someone unless or until that person fulfills certain conditions is a common human practice. We might stop talking to former friends because they have offended us in some way. We might refuse to sit at the same table with a particular party until they have apologized or explained themselves, retracted a statement or changed their behavior. Sometimes we’ve simply heard enough, and if there is nothing new to be added, there is no point in continuing the conversation. We stop talking. We stop listening.

No one has an inherent right to be listened to, and no one has an inherent obligation to listen. The world is certainly a more pleasant place when we are willing to listen and speak to others, but shunning is a very old social practice, and it can be a useful one.

The United States government and the Israeli government are not obligated to speak with Hamas simply because Hamas represents a significant portion of the Palestinian population. But we can ask the questions: Is it currently more beneficial for the U.S. to dialogue with Hamas or to refrain from such dialogue? Is it constructive at this time for Israel to talk with Hamas? Would it be more constructive to wait until certain changes occur – in Hamas’s language or actions, in its status, in its relations with Fatah? These are practical political questions.

For some, these are also moral questions, One can ask: If Americans care at all about the people of Gaza, who are experiencing severe deprivation, then how can the U.S. refuse to speak with the only de facto (if not also de jure) political authority in the Gaza Strip, i.e., Hamas? If the Americans truly value democracy, how can they refuse to sit down with the undisputed winners of a free and fair election, i.e., Hamas?

But the moral issues cut both ways. Sometimes the refusal to talk to a party is heralded as standing up for one’s moral or political principles. When a political figure espouses policies which one abhors, is it immoral to meet with that person? Or might it be moral to meet in private and unofficially but immoral to meet in public, since a public and publicized meeting runs the risk of being seen as approval or support?

The Middle East has more than its share of morally-challenged leaders. Ahmadinejad is a Holocaust-denier who imprisons his opponents. Sudan’s president Omar al-Bashir has been indicted for war crimes and crimes against humanity in Darfur. Sharon was forced to resign as Israel’s Defense Minister for his role in the Sabra and Shatila massacre.

Do you – should you – refuse to meet with such people, whose views or actions you find reprehensible? Does meeting with someone mean that you agree with their views? Of course not, though the world may construe it that way. We each make judgment calls. We each set different limits for how much contact, if any, is too much. Some people criticized President Obama not for meeting Hugo Chavez but for smiling during the meeting. Sharon never shook hands with Arafat, but Netanyahu did. Acts signify. A smile is often interpreted as friendliness. A handshake can be seen as a sign of respect, even trust.

The decision to talk or meet with an adversary is not a matter of applying a universal principle universally. It must be taken on a case-by-case basis, and each case can change over time. For example, at the beginning of the year, active U.S. engagement with the Iranian regime seemed to many to be long overdue. Now, just a few months later, in the aftermath of a fraudulent election and a crackdown on dissidents, any eager outreach to the Khamenei-Ahmadinejad regime appears unseemly.

Blood on their Hands
One argument for Israeli officials not to meet with Hamas is that Hamas members have “Jewish blood on their hands.” Indeed they do. Hamas has sent dozens of suicide bombers into Israel’s cities, causing indiscriminate mayhem. Hamas has launched thousands of rockets against Israeli cities and towns, targeting civilian populations.

It is also true that Israeli political and military leaders have much Palestinian blood on their hands. In December and January alone, during the fighting in Gaza, Israeli soldiers killing more than 1,000 men, women, and children.

In this hundred years war, thousands from both sides have killed and been killed. Yet when vital national interests are at stake, the odds are that leaders will be willing to meet, regardless of who has blood on his hands.

The moral stance of refusing to talk to or meet with an enemy who has perpetrated crimes against one’s people is understandable, perhaps even laudable. The moral imperative of speaking with that same enemy in order to prevent one’s people from suffering further harm – that too is understandable, perhaps even wise, though one’s constituents may disagree. Leaders who decide not to meet with their enemies can easily be labeled “intransigent” or “short-sighted”, while those who agree to meet can be attacked as “appeasers” and “sell-outs”.

These two sets of moral/political considerations must be weighed even as they clash against each other. The shifting balance of factors may yield different decisions at different points in time. Especially in the Middle East, today’s rejection may be followed by tomorrow’s embrace.

[Next blog posting: Talking with Hamas, Part 2]